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Abstract 6 
Following a multi-decadal decline of the European eel stock all across the continent, the EU adopted a 7 
protection and recovery plan in 2007, known as the Eel Regulation. Implementation, however, has come to a 8 
standstill: in 2015, the agreed goals had not been realised, the required protection had not been achieved, and 9 
from 2012 to 2015, no further reduction in mortality has been accomplished – while the stock is at a historical 10 
minimum. To analyse this manifest impasse, this article characterises the steering framework of the Eel 11 
Regulation as a governance problem. The Eel Problem is found to be extremely complex, due to many 12 
knowledge uncertainties and countless societal forces having an influence. The Eel Regulation divides this 13 
complexity along geographical lines, obliging national governments to implement national protection plans. 14 
This deliberate distribution of control has improved communication between countrymen-stakeholders, and has 15 
stimulated protective action in most EU Member States and elsewhere. In the absence of adequate international 16 
coordination and feedback on national plans, however, coherence is lacking and the common goals are not met. 17 
Actions and achievements have been assessed at the national level, but these assessments have not been 18 
evaluated internationally. Full geographical coverage has not been attained, nor is that plausible in future. 19 
Meanwhile, ICES’ advice remained focused on whole-stock management, a conservative approach not 20 
matching the structure of the Eel Problem or the approach of the Eel Regulation. Hence, essentially localised 21 
problems (non-reporting, insufficient action) now lead to a hard fail, paralysing the whole European eel 22 
recovery plan. Here I argue that immediate re-focusing protective actions, assessments, evaluations and advice 23 
on mortality goals and indicators, for each management area individually, will enable feedback on national 24 
protection plans, and in that way, will break the impasse.  25 
Key words: European eel, Anguilla, protection, governance, impasse, uncertainty, hard fail, distributed control, 26 
feedback, mortality limits.  27 
Introduction 28 
The stock of the European eel Anguilla anguilla (L.) is at a historical minimum. In 2007, the EU adopted a 29 
European recovery plan (Anonymous, 2007a), but recent post-evaluation indicates that implementation has 30 
come to a stand-still (ICES, 2016). This article analyses the background of this stagnation, discusses the steering 31 
framework of the recovery plan and the role of scientific advice, and suggests improvements. 32 
Since the mid-1900s, fishing yield of eel has diminished to below 10 % of the quantity caught before, and 33 
over the last three decades, recruitment of glass eel has rapidly fallen to 1-10 % of the 1960-1970s level 34 
(Dekker, 2004; ICES, 2016). In 2007, the European Union adopted a protection and recovery plan for the eel 35 
(Anonymous, 2007a). This so-called ‘Eel Regulation’ instructed EU Member States to develop national Eel 36 
Management Plans by 2009, aiming at a common objective: to reduce anthropogenic mortality in order to 37 
restore a spawner run of at least 40 % of the notional pristine run.  Accordingly, national management plans 38 
have been developed, protective actions have been implemented and more information on the status of the stock 39 
has been compiled in nineteen EU countries.  40 
Since the adoption of the Eel Regulation, the absence of reliable catch and effort data for the stock as a 41 
whole has made ICES invariably advise on precautionary grounds – to reduce all anthropogenic mortality to a 42 
minimum (ICES, 2007, 2015a). ICES has not evaluated the Eel Regulation.  43 
National post-evaluations in 2012 have shown that most countries by far did not reach the objectives 44 
specified in the Eel Regulation and – noting the high average anthropogenic mortality reported – these 45 
objectives are very unlikely to be approached in future (ICES, 2013a). Post-evaluation in 2015 recently 46 
indicated that hardly any improvement in the status of the stock has been achieved, and that – on average – 47 
mortality has not been reduced any further since 2012 (ICES, 2016). That is: implementation of the European 48 
recovery plan has essentially come to a standstill, while the required protection has not been achieved.  49 
In this article, I will argue that the international scientific advice plays a key role in this impasse. The 50 
conservative advice, focused on whole-stock management, does not lead to effective management of a stock as 51 
unconventional as the eel. Analysing sustainable management of the eel as a steering problem, the setup of the 52 
Eel Regulation is evaluated as a viable model. But without scientific advice providing feedback on its operation, 53 
it will fail hard. 54 
In the following, I will present a brief description of the eel, its fisheries and other anthropogenic impacts 55 
(the system to be controlled), and discuss the ways the eel has been managed in the past and since the adoption 56 
of the Eel Regulation (the controlling system). Subsequently, I will analyse eel management as a complex 57 
governance problem and the Eel Regulation as a simple cybernetics system, identifying bottlenecks and 58 
breakdowns in current eel management. Finally, suggestions will be given, to slip out of the impasse and to get 59 
better grip on the eel’s recovery.  60 
Eel, fisheries and other impacts 61 
The European eel occurs in habitats as diverse as the open ocean, high seas and sheltered coasts, large lakes 62 
and small ponds, main rivers and smallest streams. Continental habitat-units are typically less than 10 km2 in 63 
size (Dekker, 2000). Yet the eel constitutes the most widely distributed single fish stock in Europe, spread all 64 
over the continent and the Mediterranean (Europe, northern Africa and Mediterranean parts of Asia; Dekker, 65 
2003a). Natural reproduction has never been observed in the wild. The occurrence of the smallest larvae in the 66 
Sargasso Sea indicates the most likely location of the spawning place (Schmidt, 1922). Noting the remarkably 67 
low genetic variation observed in eels from continental waters, the whole stock is considered to constitute a 68 
single panmictic population (Palm et al., 2009). However, it is not known which part (or all) of the continental 69 
distribution actually contributes to the oceanic spawning stock. Spent eel has not been observed returning to 70 
the continent; they are supposed to die in the Sargasso Sea, spawning only once in their lifetime (semelparity).  71 
In almost the whole distribution area, commercial eel fishing provides an essential income to small-scaled 72 
inland fisheries (Moriarty and Dekker, 1997; Dekker, 2003a; Dekker & Beaulaton, 2016a). The targeted life 73 
stage varies by region. Glass eel, recruiting from the ocean towards the continent, is exploited in the countries 74 
around the Bay of Biscay. Silver eel, returning to the ocean after 3-30 years on their spawning migration, is 75 
fished throughout the distribution area, and dominates in areas of low abundance, especially in the north. The 76 
growing stages in-between, the yellow eel, is exploited throughout the distribution area, though less in areas of 77 
low abundance. Recreational fishing for eel is wide-spread, but rarely documented (e.g. Dorow, 2014; van der 78 
Hammen et al., 2015). 79 
In addition to these fisheries, many other anthropogenic activities have an impact on the stock, including 80 
land reclamation, water management, water pollution, hydropower generation, and many more. Their impacts 81 
vary from country to country, as well as from habitat to habitat type. Recent assessments (ICES, 2016) indicate 82 
that fishing and non-fishing mortalities often have a comparable impact. 83 
Over the decades, fishing yield has gradually diminished by approx. 5 % per year to below 10 % of the 84 
quantity caught half a century ago (Dekker, 2003b; ICES, 2016; Figure 1), and there are unquantifiable 85 
indications of a substantial decline before (Dekker & Beaulaton, 2016a). Since 1980, recruitment of glass eel 86 
has rapidly fallen by approx. 15 % per year to 1-10 % of the 1960-1970s level (Dekker, 2000; ICES, 2016; 87 
Figure 2). Since 2010, however, recruitment indices have generally turned upwards, though not in 2015. 88 
From 2011 to 2014, the average reported survival from anthropogenic mortality decreased from 14 % (in 89 
comparison to a situation without any anthropogenic mortality) to 11 %, while the estimated spawner 90 
escapement went slightly up from 8 % to 10 % of the pristine escapement (ICES, 2016). That is far below the 91 
objective of the Eel Regulation of 40 % escapement, while a survival from anthropogenic mortality below 40 % 92 
is not likely to enable approaching that objective (Dekker, 2010).  93 
The long-lasting downward trends in stock and fishing yield have been noted through times, all across 94 
Europe (Italy: Bellini, 1899; France: Anonymous, 1865; Germany: Walter, 1910; Sweden: Puke, 1955; 95 
European: EIFAC, 1968; Dekker, 2003b). Since the mid-1800s, attention of managers and scientists focused 96 
on optimistic compensation measures, including artificial reproduction and restocking, but these measures have 97 
failed to sustain the stock (Dekker and Beaulaton, 2016a). Artificial reproduction has not been achieved. 98 
Instead, young recruits are taken from the wild and raised in (indoor) culture facilities, a practice known as 99 
aquaculture. Aquaculture made a slow start in the 1960s, and since 1995, its production exceeds the fishing 100 
yield in the wild (Figure 1).  101 
 102 
The existing management system  103 
Traditionally, eel fisheries throughout Europe have been managed as freshwater fisheries, on a very local 104 
geographical scale. Objectives were often unspecified, and governmental actions predominantly focused on 105 
local conflict resolution, among fishers or between fishers and non-fishing stakeholders involved in water 106 
management, hydropower generation or many land uses (Dekker, 2008). In the late 1800s, technical 107 
developments (glass eel restocking, eel-ladders, gears, hot-smoking, long-distance trade, etcetera) led to a rapid 108 
exchange of expertise all over the continent, but not to coordinated action. It was only in 1925, that German 109 
glass eel imports from England to Hamburg for restocking were shared with neighbouring countries – but that 110 
cooperation ended in World War II, and did not resume afterwards (Dekker and Beaulaton, 2016b).  111 
Deelder (1970) summarised existing protection and management, without even considering management 112 
of the whole stock. Local management actions were strictly aimed at improving the income of fishers. Actions 113 
included minimum legal sizes, closed seasons, restocking, restricted licensing, gear restrictions, and more. 114 
Figure 3 presents an example of how complex national legislation often could be, and in many cases still is.  115 
The majority of eel fisheries are small-scaled and scattered over rural areas. Larger concentrations (e.g. 116 
Comacchio, Lough Neagh, and L. IJsselmeer) are rare, and jointly, these exploit only a few percent of the total 117 
stock (Dekker, 2000). More often, fisheries, and its interactions with non-fishing stakeholders, occur in very 118 
local settings with little governmental involvement. Consequently, the boundaries between documented and 119 
undocumented, commercial and non-commercial fisheries, recreational catch and poaching can be extremely 120 
vague (ICES, 2016).  121 
For the interactions with non-fishing stakeholders, there is ample evidence of early (e.g. water 122 
management), frequent (e.g. agricultural pollution), wide-spread (e.g. migration barriers) and overwhelming 123 
(e.g. industrial spills) impacts on local eel stocks. Commonly, eel fishing ranked below the interest of competing 124 
stakeholders (e.g. hydropower generation). Impacts thus being accepted, sometimes mitigated (e.g. elver 125 
ladders) or compensated (e.g. restocking) – but rarely fully remedied – detrimental effects on local eel stocks 126 
ordinarily persisted. In most cases, governments initiated mitigation and compensation programmes, often 127 
funding and controlling implementation themselves.  128 
Ultimately, the decline of the stock over the whole continent led to a call for international action (EIFAC, 129 
1968; Dekker et al., 1993; Sjöstrand & Sparholt, 1996; Dekker, 2003c; Dekker et al., 2003; Dekker and 130 
Casselman, 2014). Since the early 1970s, the European Inland Fisheries Advisory Commission (EIFAC, 1971) 131 
and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES, 1976) organised a standing Eel Working 132 
Group, to document the status of the stock and to investigate potential mitigation measures. Although this group 133 
eventually discussed the need for continent-wide protection in the 1990s, its recommendations primarily 134 
focused on national or even localised protective measures.  135 
The state of Monaco (1996) was the first to propose continent-wide coordinated action, under the Bern 136 
Convention – but when others questioned the need for action, Monaco disappointedly withdrew its proposal. 137 
Meanwhile, the European Commission had asked (Cavaco, 1997) and received scientific advice (ICES, 1999) 138 
on the alarming state of the stock. Following a period of stakeholder consultation and deliberations, the 139 
Commission proposed establishing detailed targets for eel abundance in each life stage, across all rivers in 140 
Europe (Anonymous, 2003). Existing knowledge, however, was considered insufficient to develop such a 141 
system. Emergency measures were investigated, but equitable and effective measures were hard to find. 142 
Ultimately, a fortnightly closure of all fisheries throughout Europe was proposed (Anonymous, 2003).  143 
Subsequently, Dekker (2004, 2009) questioned the need for a detailed international control over all rivers 144 
and lakes. Local eel stocks in different catchments interact only through the oceanic life stages. Hence, 145 
international interventions in national management practices need only concern the inputs (glass eel) and 146 
outputs (silver eel) of national systems, not their internal state and local means and consequences.  Setting a 147 
shared target for silver eel outputs at the international level, taking into account (past and present) glass eel 148 
inputs, could suffice to protect the oceanic stock - while the means to achieve those targets in each particular 149 
river could be managed under national responsibility. Though somewhat naively expressed in common words, 150 
Dekker (2004, 2009) essentially proposed a system of distributed control (Trentesaux, 2009), under the 151 
supervision of international orchestration and coordination. Following this proposal, the European Union 152 
adopted a stock recovery plan, the Eel Regulation (Anonymous, 2007a), in which common objectives, uniform 153 
reference points and an international evaluation process were specified, while design and implementation of 154 
protective actions and monitoring were delegated to the Member States. Accordingly, Member States developed 155 
national Eel Management, either for their whole territory or for specific areas, so-called Eel Management Units 156 
(often in accordance with the Water Framework Directive river basin districts; Figure 4). 157 
In complement to the Eel Regulation, a proposal to list the European eel on Appendix II of the CITES 158 
convention was prepared (Anonymous, 2007b), which was adopted on the same day as the Regulation and 159 
came into effect in spring 2009. Since the end of 2010, trade of European eel to or from the EU has been 160 
prohibited; internal trade is not affected.  161 
 162 
Eel management as a steering problem  163 
In past decades, radically different steering frameworks for management of the European eel stock and fisheries 164 
have been attempted: uncoordinated local action (traditional); uniform actions throughout Europe (initial 165 
discussions in EU); and a hierarchical system of distributed control (the Eel Regulation). The first has failed; 166 
the second was considered unworkable; and the third is now sliding into an impasse. In order to analyse this 167 
sombre track-record, I will apply a typology of steering strategies developed by Voß et al. (2007). Obviously, 168 
this typology is not set in stone, but the line of reasoning on which it is built might shed some light on the issues 169 
involved in the current impasse. The typology of Voß et al. characterises steering problems in three dimensions: 170 
the ambivalence of goals, the distribution of power, and the uncertainty in knowledge (Table 1). First, I discuss 171 
each of these dimensions for eel; then I type-cast the eel in this typology, and type-cast the steering model of 172 
the Eel Regulation. 173 
 174 
Ambivalence of goals  175 
Historical sources rarely identify the goals of management actions, but their actions and expectations often 176 
allow us to deduce implicit objectives (Dekker & Beaulaton, 2016a, b). Before the mid-1800s, fishers have 177 
been exploiting local eel stocks, and conflict resolution between them has been the prime goal of governmental 178 
interventions. Other fisheries (e.g. on salmon: Anonymous, 1958; on crayfish: Svärdson, 1972) experienced the 179 
eel as an unwanted competitor or a voracious predator, leading to further conflicts between fishers. 180 
Additionally, commercial and recreational fishers often had conflicting interests. 181 
In the late-1800s, non-fishing impacts had seriously deteriorated the habitats, and actions were initiated in 182 
many countries to expand or recover local eel fisheries. Though stated objectives and actions were clearly and 183 
unanimously aiming to support the fisheries, a clash of interests with non-fishing stakeholders (water managers 184 
and many land-based actors) was the ultimate reason to act. At best, those non-fishing stakeholders intended to 185 
minimise their (compensation costs for) collateral damage to the eel stock, but otherwise, they had no objectives 186 
on eel by themselves.  187 
It was only in the late 1990s, after the crash in glass eel recruitment had begun, that focus gradually shifted 188 
towards protection and recovery of the depleted stock. Those objectives now dominate the discussions, though 189 
support for the waning fisheries is also pursued. The Eel Regulation formulates its aims as “protection and 190 
sustainable use”, but societal discussion remains whether the state of the stock currently allows any exploitation 191 
or not (e.g. Seeberg et al., 2015).  192 
The international discussion on protection and recovery has been initiated by scientists, and the Eel 193 
Regulation was compiled and debated primarily in discussions with and among national governments. 194 
Consulted stakeholders (anglers, conservationists, water managers, hydropower industry and most fishers) 195 
participated in that process only marginally (Dekker, 2008). Hence, it is rather doubtful to what degree opposing 196 
forces have really united on the common goals – though few parties nowadays doubt the depleted state of the 197 
stock, or doubt the need for protection.  198 
In conclusion: there is a recent unification on protection and recovery as a minimal precondition for all 199 
anthropogenic impacts on the stock.  200 
 201 
Distribution of power  202 
“Who is in charge here? […] In modern political life, the power to influence outcomes of societal processes is 203 
shared across society” (Meadowcroft, 2007), and fisheries management is no exception to that. Amongst other 204 
fisheries, however, management of the eel appears to be one of the most complex cases, due to the extreme 205 
number of parties involved. First, like any other inland fishery, the small size of typical habitats amidst many 206 
other human activities results in frequent interaction with many other (land-based) stakeholders. Additionally, 207 
there are multiple fishing stakeholders (commercial and non-commercial fisheries, recreation and poaching). 208 
Secondly, the vertical layering of political jurisdictions involved in eel management may concern local fishers, 209 
water owners, municipalities and provincial authorities, national and international governments – each of them 210 
often represented by different functional divisions. Finally, the sheer scattering of the stock over all of Europe 211 
and the Mediterranean means that each of the powers described in the previous sentences occurs in an endlessly 212 
replicated form, with endless small variations (Dekker, 2000).  213 
The historical decline of the stock indicates that uncoordinated actions by local managers alone could not 214 
sustain the stock. Following the total ban on eel exports from Europe in 2010, evidence on substantial illegal 215 
exports of glass eel out of Europe (Shiraishi and Crook, 2015) illustrates the limits of centralised powers. In 216 
conclusion: to recover the depleted eel stock, cooperation from an extremely numerous and diverse group of 217 
entities, high and low, big and small, is required.  218 
 219 
Uncertainty in knowledge 220 
Effective steering requires knowledge of the system state, its dynamics, and a realistic view on available 221 
options. Below, I will discuss the uncertainties in each of these.  222 
System state 223 
Though it has taken decades to figure out the continental scale of the locally observed downward trends 224 
(Dekker, 2004; Dekker and Beaulaton, 2016a), the current depleted state of the whole stock is now well 225 
recognised (Jacoby and Gollock, 2014). In on-going debates, some still deny or question the facts, but with 226 
diminishing impacts on the discussions.  227 
The stock is scattered over a myriad of small habitats all over Europe and the Mediterranean. Compilation 228 
of stock-wide statistics (e.g. recruitment, abundance, landings, etc.) is hampered by the absence of information 229 
from many areas, and incomparable statistics from many others (ICES, 2016). Local monitoring, on the other 230 
hand, is easily adapted to local information needs, but these rarely match the stock-wide information needs. 231 
Though coordination and standardisation can undoubtedly improve, it is unlikely that local monitoring agencies 232 
address the stock-wide requirements adequately, or that a stock-wide assessment can cope with all locally 233 
relevant details. Bounded rationality - of the local monitors, and of the international compilers - restricts our 234 
view on the status of the stock at a far from “near-optimal” level (Simon 1955).  235 
Both the scientific advice on reference points (ICES, 2002) and the objective of the Eel Regulation refer to 236 
a percentage of pristine spawner production. Since the estimation of pristine production is far from 237 
straightforward (including or excluding habitats lost, restocking, human-induced eutrophication, increased 238 
abundance of cormorants, etcetera) and often highly speculative, the reference to a percentage of an unknown, 239 
notional quantity incorporates a high degree of uncertainty in the perception of the current state of the stock.  240 
System dynamics 241 
For the development of national management plans, all Member States constructed some model to quantify 242 
their stocks and to assess the effect of their protective actions (ICES, 2013b). Implicitly, this presupposed that 243 
local stock dynamics were well understood and quantifiable – even complex processes such as potential density-244 
dependence of growth, mortality and sex-determination. Noting the on-going scientific debates about, among 245 
others, carrying capacity and about natural mortality, national assessments in general had a rather optimistic 246 
view. In particular, the slow but persistent decline of the continental stock in the decades before the onset of 247 
the recruitment failure is rarely addressed (Dekker, 2004; Dekker and Beaulaton 2016a) and not understood. 248 
Since 1980, glass eel recruitment across Europe has shown a downward trend (Figure 2), which persisted 249 
until 2010. For the causes, it has been hypothesised that either spawner escapement from the continent might 250 
have been restricting the production of progeny (Dekker, 2003b), or spawner quality (ICES, 2015b), or oceanic 251 
survival and productivity (reviewed by Miller et al., 2009). The rather abrupt onset (in 1980) and prolonged 252 
duration of the decline (an almost constant rate of decline of 15% per year over three decades) remains largely 253 
unexplained, though Dekker (2004) speculated on a depensatory stock-recruitment relation. In the absence of 254 
conclusive evidence to either side, ICES recurred to precautionary advice: to reduce anthropogenic mortalities 255 
in order to restore spawner escapement, provisionally aiming at 30-50 % of the pristine escapement (ICES, 256 
2002). Whether an increase in spawner escapement will indeed restore recruitment remains to be seen.  257 
Predictability and uncertainty 258 
Glass eel recruitment is currently at 1-10 % of its abundance before 1980. Hence, even if all anthropogenic 259 
mortalities would be reduced to zero immediately, it is unlikely that spawner production can restore to the level 260 
aimed for by the Eel Regulation (40 %) within one generation. In fact, a speculative assessment of the full life 261 
cycle dynamics indicates, that at least four generations might be required, and much longer so if mortality 262 
cannot be zeroed completely (Åström and Dekker, 2007). Planning protective actions with effects a full 263 
generation time ahead (3-30 years) involves a high degree of uncertainty, and the stronger so for multi-264 
generational effects. The reproductive process in the ocean undoubtedly involves spawners derived from much 265 
more than a single Eel Management Unit in continental waters. Multi-generational effects in individual Eel 266 
Management Units depend strongly on future recruitment, which in turn depends on (future) spawner 267 
abundance, and thus on protective actions in other Eel Management Units. Because of this interdependence 268 
between management units, a goal formulated in terms of (future) spawner biomass is fully unpredictable for 269 
the individual management unit, until it has been nearly met.  270 
Several Member States decided in their national management plans to intensify research on topics such as 271 
artificial reproduction, restocking, eel ladders, screening of migration barriers, and more. The effect of some of 272 
their protective measures relies on the success of that research to solve the knowledge problems and some 273 
measures were postponed until such was achieved. Noting that some of these research lines have been pursued 274 
for over a century, and all of them for many decades, without solving the underlying problems, the expected 275 
success-rate of this approach appears to be less than optimal (Dekker and Beaulaton, 2016a).  276 
Summarising the above discussion of the system state, its dynamics and predictability, a number of crucial 277 
uncertainties has been identified. These fall into two distinct groups: short-term local problems (local stock 278 
dynamics) versus long-term global issues (dynamics of reproductive phase, multi-generational effects, spatial 279 
coverage and intensified research).  280 
 281 
Type-casting the Eel Problem 282 
In the 1800s and 1900s, eel fisheries developed in many countries in parallel: sharing the aim to develop 283 
(restore) national fisheries, uncoordinated actions were taken across the stock, with a high level of uncertainty 284 
(though the latter was not foreseen in the mid-1800s). In the typology of Voß et al. (2007; Table 1), the poor 285 
understanding of the dynamics of the stock, and the divergent objectives of fishing and non-fishing stakeholders 286 
definitely classify those developments as Awkward Drifting. Contemporary people involved in eel 287 
management, however, usually focused exclusively on the development of the fisheries (a shared objective) 288 
while ignoring the other impacts. Additionally, one had an over-optimistic view on the effectiveness of the 289 
mitigation measures (perceived understanding of system dynamics, ignorance of the deteriorating system state. 290 
Dekker & Beaulaton 2016a). Hence, the development of the eel fisheries was historically perceived as 291 
Collective Action, all over Europe. In as far as the poor understanding of eel biology was faced - in particular 292 
considering the unknown reproduction (“the Eel Problem”) - the hope to, one day, find the spawning places 293 
and to achieve artificial reproduction remained – a Utopian deadlock, that persists until today (Dekker & 294 
Beaulaton 2016a). An extremely prolonged decline in fishing yields; recruitment crashing after 1980; a 295 
continued poor understanding of eel biology; fishers uninvolved, often in denial; ignorance from non-fishing 296 
stakeholders and governments; and scientists alarming for years – Awkward Drifting it was.  297 
Following the adoption of the Eel Regulation in 2007, there is now unanimity on the need to protect and 298 
recover the stock – though the unanimity concerns the objectives, not the means. Restocking and fishing 299 
restrictions are the main tools of the Eel Regulation to achieve a rapid recovery, and both are considered 300 
controversial (e.g.: Westin, 2003 versus Brämick et al., 2016 on restocking; Seeberg et al, 2015 versus sources 301 
quoted in van Herten and Runhaar, 2013, on fishing). Addressing the resulting Utopian deadlock, some 302 
(national management plans, fishing stakeholders) promote intensifying research (reducing uncertainties to 303 
achieve Collective Action), while others (conservationists) call upon the central force (the EU Commissioner) 304 
to accrue more power and close all fisheries (act as a Blind Goliath, setting forceful but untested measures). 305 
Noting on the one side the unpredictable outcome of research, and on the other side the many non-fishing 306 
impacts and the limited central power, neither of these advocacies will constitute a secure tactic to break the 307 
Utopian deadlock. Actually, the disagreement on the means appears to drown the unity on the objectives in 308 
ongoing discussions, leading to a relapse to Awkward Drifting.  309 
 310 
Type-casting the Eel Regulation 311 
The current impasse in the implementation of the Eel Regulation signals a continuation of the historical 312 
Awkward Drifting. Is that due to “bungling craft and lacking will” (Voß et al., 2007), or is there a more 313 
fundamental shortcoming in the steering framework of the Eel Regulation? To examine this, I will analyse the 314 
Eel Regulation as a supervised system of distributed control, successively type-casting the dispersed 315 
management units, the central supervision and their interrelations. Alternative steering systems will be 316 
contrasted in the Discussion.  317 
National management plans 318 
In accordance with the Eel Regulation, nineteen EU Member States have developed and implemented 319 
national Eel Management Plans (Anonymous, 2014), for 89  Eel Management Units in total.  In 2012, estimates 320 
of biomass of the silver eel run were reported for 56 areas, and independent estimates of anthropogenic mortality 321 
for 39; in 2015, 80 areas reported on biomass, and 31 provided independent estimates of mortality (ICES, 2016). 322 
This indicates that the majority of areas considered their understanding of local stock dynamics to be sufficient 323 
to develop an assessment, although these assessments have not been evaluated independently.   324 
The level of stakeholder involvement has varied from country to country – but to my knowledge, no 325 
international overview of the societal discussions on Eel Management Plans has been compiled. Though fierce 326 
discussions between opposing stakeholders occurred and still occur in many countries, nowhere have conflicts 327 
completely blocked the development and implementation of national management plans.  328 
According to the Eel Regulation, the objective for all national management plans shall be “to reduce 329 
anthropogenic mortalities so as to permit […] the escapement […] of at least 40 % of the silver eel biomass 330 
[relative to the notional pristine biomass]”. Though this objective is first and foremost centred on a reduction 331 
in mortality, most national Eel Management Plans have expressed their goals in terms of biomass (or numbers), 332 
and have focused their post-evaluation on biomass indicators. Those Eel Management Plans generally note well 333 
that achieving the biomass goals from the current poor recruitment is beyond their own control (e.g. Brämick 334 
et al., 2016).  Apart from this inability to control, the choice for out-of-reach biomass goals has led to pointless 335 
discussions on their quantification (e.g. Eijsackers et al., 2009) and increased tension between opposing 336 
stakeholders (e.g. van Herten and Runhaar, 2013). Refocusing future post-evaluations on mortality indicators, 337 
on actually achievable protection levels, will refocus the discussion on controllable aspects, can reduce 338 
uncertainty in the evaluations, and reduce conflicts between opposing stakeholders.  339 
In theory, the development of national Eel Management Plans could classify as a case of successful 340 
Collective Action: agreement on the objectives to protect and restore national stocks; no major obstacles due 341 
to misunderstanding the system state and dynamics (or existing ones can be solved by refocusing on mortality 342 
goals and indicators); and cooperative involvement of all EU Member States and stakeholders. In reality, the 343 
recent post-evaluation evidences that current national control is ineffective, revealing the incapacity of many 344 
governments to achieve their objectives on eel protection on their own (ICES, 2016). While each national Eel 345 
Management Plan strives for a Utopian recovery, the Awkward Drifting effectively continues.  346 
International coordination 347 
Distributed control systems can range from fully supervised, strongly hierarchical systems to unsupervised, 348 
heterarchical systems (Trentesaux, 2009). Until recently, the eel was managed by a fully unsupervised 349 
management, on local objectives only – but the historical stock decline has evidenced the failure of this 350 
approach. At the opposite end, authoritarian centralisation has been advocated recently (e.g. Svedäng and 351 
Gipperth, 2012; Seeberg et al., 2015), but this approach has never been applied for eel before. Though 352 
authoritarian centralisation might be feasible, introducing such a radical overhaul of the management system, 353 
now, would bring about many avoidable risks in a time of crisis. Therefore, I will approach the problem here 354 
from the reverse side, in a conservative and risk-averse approach: identifying the minimum functionalities of 355 
the supervisor, i.e. those functionalities that are not or cannot be covered by the dispersed management units. 356 
Three aspects will be discussed: cooperation among management areas (including their communication), 357 
coherence of their actions, and control-uncertainty (Decker, 1987).  358 
Horizontal cooperation and communication among areas on eel management have never occurred in history 359 
(with the exception of the German restocking supply to other countries in the 1920s and 1930s). Rivalry or 360 
local conflicts between countries dominated discussions (Dekker, 2008, 2009). Since the adoption of the Eel 361 
Regulation, however, there is general agreement on the objectives to protect and restore, and national action is 362 
taken by countries in parallel. Nonetheless, horizontal communication and cooperation between countries are 363 
still uncommon, and these are exclusively focused on shared waterbodies. To establish adequate 364 
communication and cooperation for the whole stock, supervisory orchestration is required.  365 
In the years following the adoption of the Eel Regulation, a standardised reporting system for national stock 366 
indicators has been developed, that allows for mutual comparison, international integration and evaluation 367 
against the targets, at a minimum of communication costs – the so-called 3B&ΣA indicator system (Dekker, 368 
2010; ICES, 2010; ICES, 2016). This reporting system is focused on the quantification of the silver eel run 369 
(Biomass of the current run, Biomass of the potential run without anthropogenic impacts, and Biomass of the 370 
notional pristine run; the 3 B’s) and their relation to the incoming recruitment, i.e. the lifetime (‘∑’) 371 
Anthropogenic mortality ΣA. This exceptional assessment framework is adapted to the peculiarities of the eel. 372 
For any semelparous species, the spawning stock size is directly related to the lifetime mortality, more than to 373 
conventional annual mortalities. For eel, both once-in-a-lifetime as well as continuously impacting 374 
anthropogenic mortalities occur. Since average lifetimes may vary from 3-30 years, depending on the location, 375 
these different mortalities are difficult to compare when expressed on a per annum basis. Hence, the choice for 376 
a lifetime mortality approach, relating the silver eel output directly to the glass eel input from which it 377 
originated.  378 
Though not quite all countries provided estimates of the 3B&ΣA indicators, the vertical communication 379 
between the national authorities and the international level, as well as the international integration based on 380 
these indicators were effective: the achievements by area were assessed and problems (non-reporting or under-381 
achievements) identified (ICES, 2016; Figure 4, Figure 5). However, that information has not been used in 382 
providing management advice (ICES, 2015a), and so far no supervisor feedback on the achievements of 383 
national management plans has been given (Anonymous, 2014). That is: the upward communication of 384 
assessment results (sensory information) has been achieved, but the downward communication providing 385 
feedback on achievements (actuator signals) has not. Without two-way communication, the supervisory 386 
feedback system is doomed to fail. 387 
Since the adoption of the Eel Regulation, nineteen EU Member States have implemented protective actions. 388 
All those protective actions will have benefitted the recovery of the eel stock to some degree and at some time 389 
– no countries have reported antagonistic behaviour. Though global coherence has thus been achieved in 390 
principle, major differences exist between countries, in the degree to which their goals have been achieved. The 391 
estimates of the silver eel run reported by different countries for 2014 (ICES, 2016) range from 1 % to 55 % of 392 
the pristine biomass; net survival from anthropogenic mortalities ranges from 2.5 % to 96 % (in comparison to 393 
a situation without any anthropogenic mortality). While some countries transcended, others by far did not even 394 
reach the common goal. That is: no full coherence has been achieved, and gains accomplished in some countries 395 
have been annihilated by the underachievement in others. To improve coherence, the international supervision 396 
will need strengthening, providing feedback to countries on their individual achievements.  397 
Uncertainty in the control-information is a major issue. It has been the reason for ICES to recur to default 398 
precautionary advice (ICES, 2015a). Incomplete data coverage, untested data quality, a wide range of 399 
incomparable and unevaluated assessment methods have been mentioned. All of these issues occurred in the 400 
2012 post-evaluations, and remained in the 2015 post-evaluations – signalling a lack of standardisation between 401 
management units, and their inability to address their common problems. Strengthening the international 402 
orchestration and coordination will be required to reduce this uncertainty. Additionally, a major control-403 
uncertainty stems from the incongruity between the control-information and the control-decisions (Decker, 404 
1987): the mismatch between, on the one side, ICES advice – addressing a centralised, top-down management 405 
model – and, on the other side, the Eel Regulation and national Eel Management Plans – implementing a 406 
distributed control system.  407 
Type-casting the supervisory control system of the Eel Regulation according to Voß et al. (2007), there 408 
appears to be no doubt on the objectives and goals, and agreement on the need for a supervisory power. In the 409 
absence of adequate control-information, however, the international supervision does not achieve Full Control, 410 
but acts as a Blind Goliath.  411 
Discussion 412 
The eel is an extraordinary fish, and managing this fish might call for unconventional approaches. Traditional 413 
eel management was based on uncoordinated local action, as for a typical freshwater fish. Current scientific 414 
advice by ICES is focused on a whole-stock approach, as for a typical marine fish. But the eel is neither, and 415 
the analysis of the ambivalence in goals and the distribution of power, discussed above, indicates that neither 416 
the ‘freshwater’ nor the ‘marine’ steering model is likely to be effective. Whatever steering model is embraced, 417 
one has to deal with uncertainties and unknowns, the most prominent ones being the incomplete understanding 418 
of the population dynamics, the imperfect information on the status of the stock, and the absence of a well-tried 419 
steering model.  420 
To deal with the latter uncertainty (absence of a well-tried steering model), I have tested the typical 421 
freshwater approach (uncoordinated), the typical marine approach (centralised), and the Eel Regulation 422 
(distributed under supervision) against the criteria of a typology of steering models (Voß et al., 2007). This 423 
identified likely grounds for management failures in past and present. Applying this typology to examine 424 
alternative steering models, however, I run the risk of overrating the criteria of the typology as normative 425 
conditions, when their universal value has been questioned (Meadowcroft, 2007). Is the approach of the Eel 426 
Regulation a viable option, or the only feasible one? Rather than addressing that type of questions, Voß et al. 427 
(2007) state that “[applying] this typology allows for deliberation of the match between the problem and the 428 
strategy in [this] particular context of steering for sustainable development”.  429 
The objective of the Eel Regulation is alternately worded as either “the protection” (e.g. Article 1) or “the 430 
recovery” (e.g. the title of the Regulation) of the stock of European eel.  Whereas protection can be achieved 431 
immediately and by each management area independently, recovery is necessarily a long-term, global objective, 432 
outside the competence of individual management areas, and overshadowed by uncertainties about stock 433 
dynamics. The effectiveness of steering towards sustainable management would greatly improve by refocusing 434 
in the short term on mortality goals and indicators, on protection. However, establishing an agreed level of 435 
protection does not guarantee a recovery, due to unavoidable uncertainties in stock dynamics. In the long-term, 436 
an international strategy will be required addressing those uncertainties. Mixing up short-term and long-term 437 
requirements, however, is confusing societal debates, and thereby postpones the urgently required protection.  438 
The spatial coverage of management reports and monitoring information is by far not complete (Figure 4). 439 
Despite recent efforts to establish a major expansion in the Mediterranean (ICES, 2016), complete coverage is 440 
unlikely to be achieved, ever. This incomplete coverage increases the uncertainties at the international, long-441 
term scale. Compensatory actions in other areas can be considered, but – in the absence of information on the 442 
non-reporting areas – these cannot be quantified.  443 
In the absence of feedback on the status of the stock and the level of protection, societal discussions have 444 
drifted away from the objectives and achievements, towards questioning the means to protect, which have their 445 
uncertainties indeed. Local monitoring, evaluation and feedback would have dealt with these uncertainties by 446 
signalling the (in)-adequate results of actions taken, even in a rather short run. Without feedback, however, the 447 
control-decisions have become ambivalent, and irresolute actions are taken. Collective Action from national 448 
protection plans thus degenerates into Awkward Drifting, again.   449 
The elusiveness of the eel and its management, the Eel Problem, is an extraordinarily complex issue. That 450 
complexity has troubled effective management for a century or more. The approach, adopted in the Eel 451 
Regulation, has been to divide the complexity along geographical lines, into independent parts that can be 452 
managed more successfully. This deliberate distribution of control has triggered societal discussions between 453 
countrymen-stakeholders, has initiated the national assessments of stock status and potential actions, and has 454 
(re)-focused national discussions on protection and recovery. Current scientific advice (ICES, 2015a), however, 455 
is focused on the whole stock (all of Europe and the Mediterranean). For the whole stock, though, no 456 
comprehensive assessment could be and will ever be achieved. Hence, restricted by the absence of control-457 
information, international evaluation of control-decisions considered the implementation only; the 458 
achievements of national protection plans have not been evaluated (Anonymous, 2014).   459 
Distributed control systems are renowned for their reliability, amongst others due to their ability to handle 460 
‘soft fails’ (Decker, 1987): local problems can be handled locally, without paralysing the whole system. 461 
Incomplete data coverage, untested data quality, a wide range of incomparable and unevaluated assessment 462 
methods – all of these are wide-spread, but essentially local problems, which can be addressed locally under 463 
international orchestration. Analysis of the international advice on eel, however, indicates that the absence of 464 
reliable information from many areas currently blocks all feedback, even on other, more successful areas. 465 
Localised problems thus have led to a ‘hard fail’ of the whole system, obstructing the evaluation and adjustment 466 
of protective measures actually taken – and hence, the Awkward Drifting perpetuates.  The whole-stock 467 
approach of the current scientific advice (ICES, 2015a) does not match the characteristics of the Eel Problem 468 
or the strategy of the Eel Regulation, and does not relate to on-going management actions. It is merely an echo 469 
of the advice given in 2000 (ICES, 2000).  470 
Conclusions 471 
In my opinion, the current impasse in the implementation of the protection and recovery plan for the 472 
European eel can be broken by immediately re-focusing all protective actions, assessments, evaluations and 473 
advice on anthropogenic mortality goals and indicators – considering each of the management areas (countries) 474 
individually. This will provide feedback to each area and all societal parties currently involved, and improve 475 
effectiveness and consistency of the protection given. Second priority, although no less urgent, is the 476 
compilation of a strategic plan to scrutinise and consolidate existing assessments and management plans, and 477 
to expand their spatial coverage, ultimately striving towards full geographical coverage of the whole population. 478 
Finally, but not as a matter of urgency, there is a requirement for a comprehensive strategy, on how to deal with 479 
all the uncertainties surrounding the long-term dynamics of the population – if a fully rational strategy may 480 
exist for this extraordinary fish at all. However, it is only through adopting distributed control and strengthening 481 
international orchestration that a feasible management model for the European eel can be developed, 482 
eliminating the most crucial uncertainty for the protection of this severely depleted stock. Only then can the 483 
current Awkward Drifting turn into successful Collective Action. 484 
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Table 1 Typology of steering problems according to Voß et al 2007. Their table 1 (a list of cases) is slightly reworded and 633 
fully re-formatted here as a 3D-table. Horizontal:  uncertainty in knowledge; vertical: ambivalence of goals; shading: 634 
distribution of power. The examples by Voß et al (2007) are given in italics. 635 
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Figure 1 Time trend in eel production, combining fishing yield from the wild stock with aquaculture (using wild glass eel). 637 
Data from ICES (2013a); fishing yield for non-reporting countries has been reconstructed using the model of Dekker (2003b). 638 
For the fishing yield, the hatched part is what Dekker & Beaulaton (2016b) attribute to restocking. Data for later years are 639 
incomplete (ICES, 2016). 640 
 641 
Figure 2 Time trends in 28 glass eel recruitment data series. Data from ICES (2016). Dashed lines: North Sea area; solid 642 
lines: elsewhere. Bold lines: general trends - see ICES (2016) for details on individual series and the trend analysis. Note 643 
the logarithmic scale of the vertical axis. 644 
 645 
Figure 3 Minimum legal size limits over time in Swedish lakes and rivers, by ICES subdivision (SD) into which they drain; 646 
some lakes are identified individually, by name. Dashed: applied to silver eel in lakes but not in rivers, and to all yellow eel; 647 
solid: applied to all life stages in all waters. For coastal waters, another equally complex set of minimum size limits applied. 648 
(After Dekker et al., 2011). 649 
 650 
Figure 4 Estimates of silver eel runs and management targets per eel management unit, reported in 2015. This figure presents 651 
the estimates as reported by the countries – inconsistencies in assessment methods and in interpretations exist. For each 652 
area, estimates are given for the current silver eel run (cur., green), the potential run given the current low glass eel 653 
recruitment (best, orange), the escapement target of the EU Eel Regulation (40%, red), and the notional pristine biomass 654 
(prist., grey); for areas without information, a weeping smiley () is shown. (Data from ICES, 2016). 655 
 656 
Figure 5 Modified Precautionary Diagram, presenting the status of the stock (horizontal) and the anthropogenic impacts 657 
(vertical) for each reporting Eel Management Unit as reported in 2015; the size of each bubble is proportional to the potential 658 
silver eel run. The left axis shows the lifetime anthropogenic mortality, while the right axis shows the corresponding survival 659 
rate. Note the logarithmic scale of the horizontal and right axis, corresponding to the inherently logarithmic nature of the 660 
left axis. (Data from ICES, 2016). 661 
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